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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 





STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 We here review the district court’s dismissal under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) of a multiple-count complaint brought 
against the City of Pittsburgh (the “City”) and the Pittsburgh 
Water & Sewer Authority (the “Authority”) by Independent 
Enterprises Inc. (“Independent”), a construction company, and 
Thomas Lozecki, a City taxpayer and Authority ratepayer.1  The 
claims asserted in the complaint include a civil contempt of 
court claim, an equal protection claim and procedural and 
substantive due process claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
and pendent state law claims.  All of these claims arose in the 
context of the Authority’s failure to award Independent three 
Authority contracts on which Independent had submitted the lowest 
bids. 
                     






 I.  The Facts 
 Because the district court dismissed Independent's 
claims pursuant to a motion to dismiss under Fed R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6), we accept as true all factual allegations in 
Independent’s complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom.2 
 Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 62, 65 (3d Cir. 1996); Spence v. Straw, 
54 F.3d 196, 197 (3d Cir. 1995).   
 In 1986, Independent sued the City and Authority in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania after the City declared that Independent was 
"noncompetent" to bid on any projects in which it had an interest 
and the Authority consequently rejected a low bid by Independent. 
 In settlement of that suit, the parties agreed to a consent 
decree that was ultimately entered by the court.  The consent 
decree provided that Independent could not be "debarred" from 
bidding on City contracts based on any past performance, and that 
if the City or Authority wanted to "disqualify" Independent from 
                     
2.  The Appellees filed a "Motion to Dismiss or For Judgment on 
the Pleadings."  Independent argues on appeal that the district 
court converted the Appellees' motion to one for summary judgment 
by considering matters outside of the pleadings, and that such 
conversion was improper because Independent was not given notice 
of the conversion or an opportunity to submit relevant materials. 
 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).  Independent thus asserts that "it 
was reversible error for the district court to grant the motion 
without having afforded Independent any opportunity to submit 
materials under Rule 56."  Appellant's Brief at 34.  Because 
Independent indeed was not given an opportunity to submit 
evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment, we will treat 
the district court's decision as a 12(b)(6) dismissal and will 
disregard anything other than the allegations of the complaint 





City or Authority work because of problems with future 
performances, it would first have to conduct a hearing under the 
Pennsylvania Local Agency Law.  Between the issuance of the 
consent decree and the solicitation of bids for the 1995 
contracts at issue here, Independent satisfactorily performed 
"numerous" contracts for both the City and Authority. 
 In May 1995, the Authority solicited bids for two 
projects, the "Annual Water Line Contract" and the "Grandview 
Avenue Project."  Independent submitted bids for both projects.  
In accordance with the Authority's "MBE/WBE Utilization 
Requirements," each of Independent's bids included a list of 
minority- and women-owned business enterprises ("MBE/WBEs") that 
Independent intended to use as subcontractors if awarded the 
contract.  One of the MBEs Independent listed was Whaley & Sons, 
a firm that Independent claims was certified by the Authority as 
an approved MBE/WBE vendor.  Independent's bids were the lowest 
for both projects, and an independent consultant recommended that 
the Authority award both contracts to Independent. 
 Before the Authority made a decision about awarding  
the contracts, the City's Deputy Mayor of Government Operations, 
Salvatore Sirabella, issued a memorandum (the "Sirabella 
memorandum") to the Authority's Executive Director.  In the 
memorandum Sirabella expressed concern about the cost over-run on 
a recent Authority project that had been completed by 
Independent, and directed the Authority to "temporarily halt 
awarding any contracts to Independent ...."  App. at 87.  Shortly 





the Authority (the "Board") decided that Whaley & Sons was an 
unacceptable MBE subcontractor and resolved to reject 
Independent's bids for both the Water Line Contract and the 
Grandview Avenue Project "for failure to meet the MBE/WBE 
requirements of the specifications."  Auth. Res. 67 & 68, App. at 
197-98.  The Board then awarded the two contracts to the next 
lowest bidders.  About a month later, the contracts with those 
bidders were rescinded, all bids were rejected, and the Authority 
resolved to readvertise both the Water Line and Grandview Avenue 
projects.   
 In June, 1995, Independent submitted a bid to the 
Authority for the "Annual Sewer Improvement Contract."  Again, 
Independent's was the lowest responsible bid.  And again, despite 
its low bid, Independent was not awarded the contract.  There was 
apparently some communication between the attorney for the 
Authority and Independent regarding the absence of a Power of 
Attorney form in Independent's bid package, but ultimately the 
Authority did not reject Independent's bid on that basis.  
Instead, the Authority's Board simply rejected all of the Sewer 
Improvement Contract bids without explanation and readvertised 
the project. 
 In response to the Authority's failure to award it the 
Water Line Contract, the Grandview Avenue Project, and the Sewer 
Improvement Contract, Independent filed this suit.   Its 
complaint alleged that:  (1) the Authority and City violated the 
terms of the consent decree by "disqualifying" Independent from 





Utilization Requirements discriminate against Independent and 
other construction companies on the basis of race, ethnicity, 
national origin, and/or sex, thereby denying them the equal 
protection of the laws; and (3) the Authority's and the City's 
disqualification of Independent, and the Authority's resulting 
refusal to award it the Water Line Contract, the Grandview Avenue 
Project, and the Sewer Improvement Contract, deprived Independent 
of property without procedural and substantive due process. 
 The district court dismissed all of Independent’s 
federal claims.  First, the court dismissed the § 1983 claims 
against the Authority on the ground that the Authority is not a 
"person" within the meaning of § 1983.  The district court then 
dismissed the civil contempt claim on the ground that Independent 
had not been "debarred" from bidding on City or Authority 
contracts.   
 Turning to Independent's procedural due process claim, 
the district court held that "Pennsylvania provides a judicial 
procedure for unsuccessful bidders to challenge whether a local 
contracting authority has violated a bidder's rights under the 
Municipal Authority Act."  Op. at 7.  In the court's view, an 
adequate post-deprivation procedure thus existed to satisfy the 
demands of the Due Process Clause.  The court dismissed 
Independent's substantive due process claims because it found 
that Independent had not alleged facts showing that the City had 
deprived it of a protected property interest.   
 With respect to the equal protection claim, the court 





failed to allege a causal connection between the MBE/WBE 
requirements and the injury Independent had suffered from the 
rejection of its bids.3   
 We will affirm the dismissal of Independent's due 
process claims.  We will reverse the judgment of the district 
court, however, and remand for further proceedings on 
Independent's civil contempt and equal protection claims. 
 
 II.  The Civil Contempt Claim 
 In Count I of its complaint, Independent alleges that 
the Authority and City are in civil contempt of court because 
their disqualification of Independent pursuant to the Sirabella 
memorandum and the Authority's resulting rejection of 
Independent's three low bids violated the terms of the 1986 
consent decree.  The district court dismissed the contempt claim 
because it found that the facts alleged did not show a violation 
of the terms of the consent decree.  We disagree.   
 The 1986 consent decree provided in part: 
2.  Independent shall not be debarred from bidding on 
any City of Pittsburgh Contract based on past 
conduct or performance. 
 
3.  Independent, City and Authority shall act in a 
cooperative manner on all contracts.  
Independent shall: 
 
 (a) cooperate with inspectors at job        
   site; and 
 
                     
3.  The district court, having dismissed the federal claims, 
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Independent's 
state claims and dismissed them without prejudice.  It may 
reconsider that decision on remand in light of our disposition of 





 (b) cooperate with consultants and           
      officials of the City and Authority    
        in regard to problems that occur at  
          the job site and administrative    
            matters; and 
 
 (c) move quickly to resolve any disputes     
      with adjoining property owners as a    
        result of their work. 
 
4.  If, because of problems with future performances, 
the City or Authority desire to disqualify 
Independent from City or Authority work, a 
hearing shall be held prior to 
disqualification under the Pennsylvania Local 
Agency Law, and Independent shall have all 
rights afforded thereunder. 
App. at 138-39.   
 At the time the consent decree was entered, the 
Pittsburgh Code contained a provision entitled "Debarment from 
Bidding On and Participating in City Contracts."  § 161.22.  This 
provision states that any person or enterprise that had committed 
an "offense," as defined therein, will not be allowed to bid and 
will not be "a responsible bidder on any city contract."  
"Offense" is defined in a non-exclusive list to include sixteen 
different categories of conduct ranging from fraud in connection 
with the obtaining or performance of a contract to the following: 
 (10)  Willful or material failure to perform 
the terms of a contract or agreement in 
accordance with specifications or within 
contractual time limits; 
 
 (11)  A record of failure to perform or of 
unsatisfactory performance in accordance with 
the terms of one or more contracts, provided 
that the failure or unsatisfactory 
performance was within a reasonable period of 
time preceding the determination to debar and 
was caused by acts within the control of the 
person or enterprise debarred; 





 (16)  Other cause affecting responsibility as 
a city contractor or vendor as may be 
determined by the city. 
 
Pittsburgh Code § 161.22(b).  Debarments under this provision are 
to last for "a reasonable, definitely stated period . . . 
commensurate with the seriousness of the cause therefore," but 
"as a general rule [are not to] exceed three years."  Id.   
§ 161.22(d)(3).  Debarment proceedings are initiated at the 
discretion of the Mayor and the City's Director of the Department 
of General Services.  The stipulated process includes a notice to 
the contractor and a right to a hearing before the Director at 
which the cause for the debarment has to be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
 The Pennsylvania Local Agency Law referenced in 
paragraph 4 of the consent decree is found in Title 2 of the 
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes Annotated at §§ 551-555 and 
751-754.4  These subchapters relate solely to process; they 
stipulate the procedural rights that interested parties will have 
in any "adjudication" by a local agency, e.g., the rights to a 
hearing, representation by counsel, cross-examination, a written 
decision, judicial review, etc.  Nothing in these subchapters 
                     
4.  Title 2 is devoted to "Administrative Law and Procedure."  
Subchapter 5A provides procedure for "Commonwealth agencies" and 
subchapter 5B stipulates procedure for "local agencies", which 
include any "government agency other than a Commonwealth agency." 
 2 Pa. C.S.A. § 101.  Section 105 of Title 2 provides: 
 
 The provisions of Subchapter B of Chapter 5 
(relating to practice and procedure of local 
agencies) and Subchapter B of Chapter 7 
(relating to judicial review of local agency 
action) shall be known and may be cited as 





describes the circumstances under which a would-be contractor may 
be foreclosed from contracting with a local agency. 
 In the context of these statutory provisions and the 
litigation that produced the consent decree, the intent of 
paragraph 4 seems clear and unambiguous.  Independent was 
concerned about being foreclosed from doing City and Authority 
work based on complaints about its conduct and contract 
performance.  In the interest of settling the pending lawsuit, 
the City was willing to assure that there would be no foreclosure 
based on past conduct or performance.  While it and the Authority 
were not willing to give the same assurance with respect to 
future contract performance, they were willing to commit to 
hearing Independent's side of the story regarding any alleged 
deficiency in its performance before foreclosing it from City and 
Authority work.  Independent would be able to give its side in a 
hearing to be held in accordance with the Pennsylvania Local 
Agency Law.  This reading of paragraph 4 gives the word 
"disqualified" its commonly understood meaning.  "Disqualify," 
according to Webster, means "to deprive of a power, right or 
privilege" or make "ineligible . . . for further competition 
because of violations of the rules," Webster's Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary 366 (1990); Black defines "disqualify" as 
"to render ineligible."  Black's Law Dictionary 472 (6th ed. 
1990). 
 Given this intent, we further think it clear that if 
Independent can prove its allegations, it will have established a 





directive, as alleged, resulted in Independent's not being 
considered for City or Authority work for a period of time 
because of a cost overrun on a contract entered after the consent 
decree, the failure to give Independent a hearing on the overruns 
was a violation of paragraph 4. 
 In reaching its contrary conclusion, the district court 
reasoned that (1) "debarred" in paragraph 2 was intended to 
include only disqualifications for City work pursuant to the 
"formal procedure" spelled out in § 161.22 of the City Code; (2) 
"disqualify" in paragraph 4 is synonymous with the concept of 
"debar" in paragraph 2; (3) there was no "formal procedure" under 
§ 161.22 conducted in connection with the Sirabella directive; 
and (4) therefore, there was no disqualification of Independent 
and no need for a hearing.  We believe this approach leaves 
paragraphs 2 and 4 virtually without effect. 
 Even assuming that "debarred" in paragraph 2 refers to 
a foreclosure from City work for a period of time for the reasons 
set forth in § 161.22, it seems highly unlikely to us that the 
parties intended to limit its scope to situations in which the 
City both foreclosed Independent and invoked the formal process 
of § 161.22.  After all, paragraph 2 simply says that the City 
won't debar Independent, i.e., declare it a non-responsible 
bidder, for past performance.  But even further assuming that 
paragraph 2 is so limited, "disqualified" could not have been 
intended to limit the scope of paragraph 4 to situations where 





City-specific and, by its own terms, cannot be invoked by the 
Authority.5   
 Giving the word "disqualify" and the phrase "because of 
problems with future performances" in paragraph 4 their commonly 
understood meaning, we find paragraph 4 broad enough to include a 
blanket foreclosure of Independent from City or Authority work 
because of an overrun on a post-consent decree contract.  
Moreover, it seems to us that the stated causes for debarment 
under § 161.22 are broad enough to include such a foreclosure.  
Accordingly, our conclusion would not be different even if we 
regarded the term "disqualify" in paragraph 4 as limited by the 
use of "debarred" in paragraph 2.   
 
 III.  The § 1983 Claims 
 A.  The "Person" Requirement 
 Independent brought its equal protection and due 
process claims against the City and Authority under 42 U.S.C.  
                     
5.  In its opinion, the district court commented that, even 
assuming there had been a violation of the consent decree, the 
appropriate remedy would have been to file an application in the 
earlier suit.  In response to the district court's suggestion, 
Independent stresses that the judge who presided over the former 
civil action had retired before the present action was commenced. 
 Therefore, Independent argues, nothing should preclude it from 
including the contempt of court claim with its other claims 
against Appellees, and indeed that "[t]he assertion of all claims 
in one action serves the interests of judicial economy of 
resources.  Moreover, even if the civil action was required to be 
brought at the old docket number, the proper action would be to 
transfer the matter rather than dismissal [sic]."  Appellant's 
Brief at 21 n.6.  We agree that Independent should not be 
precluded from pursuing its contempt claim merely because it, for 
apparently logical reasons, failed to file that claim under the 





§ 1983, which provides that: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State . . . subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States 
or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to be deprived of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution or laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.   
 In support of its conclusion that the Authority "is not 
a 'person' within the meaning of section 1983," Op. at 4, the 
district court cited Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 
491 U.S. 58 (1989).  Will held that "neither a State nor its 
officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under 
§ 1983."  Id. at 71.  We cannot accept the district court's 
conclusion that Will compels a finding that the Authority is not 
a "person" under § 1983.  Indeed, the limited record presently 
available on the issue indicates that the Authority, in all 
likelihood, is a "person" under § 1983.6 
                     
6.  At oral argument, counsel for the Authority informed us that 
the Authority had not argued before the district court that it 
was not a "person" under § 1983.  Counsel further candidly 
acknowledged that she could cite no case in which a public entity 
had been held not to be a "person" on the basis of a record 
similar to the one before us.  Counsel stopped short of 
conceding, however, that the Authority is a "person" under § 
1983.  As a result, the district court, on remand, will have to 
determine whether the Authority is a "person."   This will 
require it to afford the parties the opportunity to develop a 
record and to then weigh, with the assistance of the parties, the 
factors identified by this court in Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit 
Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989), and Bolden v. Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 953 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 





 The framework for addressing the question of whether 
the Authority is a "person" within the meaning of § 1983 was 
established by Will and the earlier case of Monell v. New York 
City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).  In 
Monell, the Supreme Court overturned its earlier decision in 
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), and held that municipalities 
and other local government units are "persons" subject to 
liability under § 1983.  436 U.S. at 690.  However, the Court 
limited its holding "to local government units not considered 
part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes."  Id. at 690 
n.54. 
 In Will, the Court gave effect to the limitation 
expressed in Monell.  Relying on the ordinary meaning of the term 
"person," the legislative history of § 1983, and federalism 
concerns, the Court held that "neither a State nor its officials 
acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983." 
 491 U.S. at 71.  The Will Court emphasized the continuing 
validity of Monell, however, and limited Will's holding "only to 
States or governmental entities that are considered 'arms of the 
State' for Eleventh Amendment purposes."  Id. at 70. 
 The limitations that define the boundaries of the 
holdings in Monell and Will establish that the most important 
inquiry in determining whether a governmental entity is a 
"person" within the meaning of § 1983 is whether the entity is an 
"'arm[] of the State' for Eleventh Amendment purposes."  Id.; see 
also Monell, 463 U.S. at 690 n.54.  In Fitchik v. New Jersey 





to be considered in analyzing an entity's status as an "arm of 
the State" entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity: 
(1) Whether the money that would pay the judgment would 
come from the state (this includes three ... 
factors--whether payment would come from the 
state's treasury, whether the agency has the 
money to satisfy the judgment, and whether 
the sovereign has immunized itself from 
responsibility for the agency's debts); 
(2) The status of the agency under state law (this 
includes four factors--how state law treats 
the agency generally, whether the entity is 
separately incorporated, whether the agency 
can sue or be sued in its own right, and 
whether it is immune from state taxation); 
and 
(3) What degree of autonomy the agency has. 
 
873 F.2d at 659 (summarizing more detailed list of factors set 
forth in Urbano v. Board of Managers, 415 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 948 (1970)).  See also Bolden, 953 
F.2d at 814-16. 
 We have repeatedly held that the most important factor 
in determining whether an entity is an "arm of the State" for 
purposes of the Eleventh Amendment is "whether any judgment would 
be paid from the state treasury."  Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 659; see 
also Christy v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 54 F.3d 1140, 1145 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 340 (1995); Bolden, 953 F.2d 
at 818; Urbano, 415 F.2d at 251.  According to Pennsylvania's 
Municipal Authorities Act of 1945 (the "MAA"), under which the 
Authority is organized, the Authority "shall have no power ... to 
pledge the credit or taxing power of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania ..., nor shall any of its obligations be deemed to 
be obligations of the Commonwealth ..., nor shall the 





interest on such obligations."  53 P.S. § 306(C).  The MAA also 
grants the Authority the power "[t]o fix, alter, charge and 
collect rates and other charges ... for the purpose of providing 
for the payment of the expenses of the Authority, ... [and] the 
payment of the principal and of interest on its obligations ...." 
 Id. § 306(B)(h).  Because the Authority also has the power "[t]o 
sue and be sued," id. § 306(B)(b), the "obligations" which the 
Authority will pay from the funds collected through "rates and 
other charges" presumably include judgments.  Under these 
provisions, it appears that the Authority's funding does not come 
primarily from the State, and that any judgment against the 
Authority would not be "paid from the state treasury."  This 
would weigh heavily against the Authority's being considered "an 
arm of the State" for Eleventh Amendment purposes. 
 The second factor, the Authority's status under state 
law, also appears to weigh against a finding that the Authority 
is an "arm of the State," if less clearly.  Like SEPTA, which we 
held in Bolden is a “person” under § 1983, 953 F.2d at 820, the 
Authority appears to exhibit some attributes not characteristic 
of an arm of the State and other attributes that are associated 
with the State.  On the one hand, a municipal authority is "a 
body politic and corporate," 53 P.S. § 302, with the power to sue 
and be sued.  Id. § 306(B)(b).  In addition, municipal agencies 
are not entitled to sovereign immunity from state tort actions 
under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8521, but instead are "local agencies" 





§ 8541.  See Miller v. McKeesport Mun. Water Auth., 555 A.2d 790 
(Pa. 1989); E-Z Parks, Inc. v. Larson, 498 A.2d 1364, 1369 (Pa. 
Cmwlth. 1985), aff'd per curiam, 503 A.2d 931 (Pa. 1986). 
 On the other hand, municipal authorities have the power 
of eminent domain, 53 P.S. §306(B)(l), and have been held to be 
"agencies of the Commonwealth" independent from their 
incorporating municipality and not governed by laws empowering 
local municipalities.  Whitemarsh Township Auth. v. Elwert, 196 
A.2d 843, 845-46 (Pa. 1964); Forney v. State Ethics Comm'n, 425 
A.2d 66, 68 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981); Highland Sewer & Water Auth. v. 
Engelbach, 220 A.2d 390, 392 (Pa. Super. 1966). 
 Like the first two, the third factor, the Authority’s 
“degree of autonomy” from the state, seems to weigh against a 
finding that the Authority is an “arm of the State.”  The 
provisions of the MAA afford the Authority a high degree of 
autonomy from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  For example, the 
members of the Board--which exercises all of the Authority's 
powers--are appointed not by the State but by the governing body 
of the City of Pittsburgh, the incorporating municipality.  53 
P.S. § 309(A)(a).  The Authority is granted "all powers necessary 
or convenient" for carrying out its purposes, including, inter 
alia, the power to sue and be sued, to purchase property, to make 
by-laws, to appoint officers and define their duties, and to make 
contracts.  Id. § 306(B). 
 We have thus far discussed only the most significant 
inquiry identified by Will and Monell, i.e., whether an entity is 





relied on two additional factors in reaching the conclusion that 
a State is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983 -- (1) 
"the language of Section 1983 and the meaning of the word 
'person'" and (2) the fact that "states enjoyed sovereign 
immunity from suit at common law, and ... Section 1983 was not 
intended to override 'well established immunities or defenses 
under common law.'"  Bolden, 953 F.2d at 816.  We note that 
neither of these factors supports the district court's finding 
that the Authority is not a "person" under § 1983. 
 First, although the term "person" in common usage does 
not include the "sovereign," Will, 491 U.S. at 64, the term does 
refer to "bodies corporate and politic," meaning "corporations, 
both private and public (municipal)."  Id. at 70.  Because the 
Authority is expressly identified under the MAA as a "body 
politic and corporate," 53 P.S. § 302, and appears to be the sort 
of "public corporation" that is included in the "common usage" of 
the term "person," the linguistic rationale underlying Will's 
exclusion of States from the "persons" suable under § 1983 does 
not apply to the Authority. 
 Second, the Will Court also recognized that "in 
enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to override well-
established immunities under the common law."  491 U.S. at 67.  
Therefore, because the sovereign immunity to which States are 
entitled was a well-recognized principle of the common law at the 
time § 1983 was enacted, the Court was unwilling to extend § 1983 
liability to States.  Id.  The Authority, however, cannot claim 





States.  In Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 646 
(1980), the Supreme Court noted that municipalities had lost 
their entitlement to sovereign immunity by the end of the 19th 
century.  In addition, Pennsylvania courts have explicitly held 
that local municipal authorities such as a public parking 
authority and a local redevelopment authority are not entitled to 
the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the Commonwealth.  See, e.g., 
Trustees of Second Presbyterian Congregation v. Public Parking 
Auth. of Pittsburgh, 119 A.2d 79 (Pa. 1956); Greer v. 
Metropolitan Hosp., 341 A.2d 520, 528 (Pa.Super. 1975).  
Therefore, treating the Authority as a "person" under § 1983 
would not override any common law immunity to which the Authority 
is entitled. 
 It would be premature to express an opinion on the 
result that the required weighing process should produce.  A 
record must first be developed and the parties permitted to 
comment upon it.  We hold only that the Authority may be a person 
within the meaning of § 1983 and that the district court erred in 
ruling to the contrary on the present record.   
 
 B.  The Equal Protection Claim 
 Having concluded that it was error to dismiss the  
§ 1983 claims against the Authority on the ground that it is not 
a "person," we now turn to Independent's equal protection claim. 
 It alleges that the Authority's MBE/WBE Utilization 
Requirements, which were the asserted basis for the Authority's 





Grandview Avenue Project, discriminate against Independent and 
its owners on the basis of race, sex, or national origin, thereby 
violating their right to equal protection.  The district court 
dismissed the claim for lack of standing because it found that 
Independent "fail[ed] to allege facts that establish a causal 
relationship between the injury--its rejected bids--and the 
challenged conduct--the minority utilization requirement."  Op. 
at 11.  It reached this conclusion by focusing on those portions 
of the complaint alleging that Independent had submitted bids in 
compliance with the utilization requirements and that those bids 
were rejected because of the Sirabella memorandum.   
 Standing is "an essential and unchanging part of the 
case-or-controversy requirement of Article III" of the 
Constitution.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 
(1992).  In order to satisfy the standing requirement, a party 
must demonstrate (1) an "injury in fact" which is both "concrete 
and particularized" and "actual or imminent"; (2) a causal 
relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct such 
that the injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action of 
the defendant"; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be 
redressed by a favorable decision.  Northeast Fla. Chapter of 
Assoc'd Gen. Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville, 508 
U.S. 656, 663 (1993) (citations omitted).  At this stage in the 
proceeding, we look to the plaintiff's complaint to determine 





 In construing the plaintiff's complaint, we are of 
course bound by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Rule 
8(e)(2) of those Rules provides that: 
A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim 
or defense alternatively or hypothetically, 
either in one count or defense or in separate 
counts or defenses. ...  A party may also 
state as many separate claims or defenses as 
the party has, regardless of consistency .... 
This Rule permits inconsistency in both legal and factual 
allegations, see, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp., 
430 F.2d 531, 536 (8th Cir. 1970); Dugan v. Bell Telephone of 
Pa., 876 F. Supp. 713, 722 (W.D. Pa. 1994); 5 Wright & Miller, 
Federal Practice & Procedure § 1283, at 533 (1990), and has been 
interpreted to mean that a court "may not construe [a 
plaintiff's] first claim as an admission against another 
alternative or inconsistent claim."  Henry v. Daytop Village, 42 
F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 1994); Molsbergen v. United States, 757 F.2d 
1016, 1019 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985).  
This is especially the case in circumstances in which proving the 
plaintiff's alternative claims may require "complex inquiries 
into the parties' intent."  Henry, 42 F.3d at 95. 
 The district court here failed to afford Independent 
the privilege of asserting alternative and inconsistent claims.  
Independent's complaint alleges, inter alia, two inconsistent 
claims:  First, Independent claims that the Authority and the 
City disqualified it from Authority work, per the instruction in 
the Sirabella memorandum, in violation of the 1986 consent 





the Authority's asserted reason for rejecting it's Water Line and 
Grandview Avenue bids, i.e., the alleged failure to comply with 
the MBE/WBE requirements, was a pretext intended to mask the 
Authority's disqualification of Independent in a manner which 
violated the consent decree.  Alternatively, Independent asserts 
that if the Authority in fact rejected its bids because  
Independent failed to satisfy the MBE/WBE requirements, that 
rejection was a violation of Independent's Fourteenth Amendment 
right to equal protection.  Thus, in accordance with Rule 
8(e)(2), Independent's equal protection claim must be examined 
independently of its contempt claim to determine whether 
Independent has standing to pursue the claim. 
 Independent's equal protection claim does allege facts 
satisfying all of the requirements of standing.  The complaint 
alleges an injury in fact (the rejection of Independent's bids); 
causation (that the rejection resulted, according to the 
Authority, from Independent's inability to meet satisfactorily 
the Authority's MBE/WBE Utilization Requirements)7; and 
                     
7.  The Authority argues that Independent's allegation that its 
bids were rejected "ostensibly" because of its failure to satisfy 
the MBE/WBE requirements does not constitute an "affirmative 
allegation" that Independent was precluded from getting the 
contracts because of the allegedly discriminatory requirements.  
However, reading the complaint as a whole and clarifying any 
ambiguities in Independent's favor, it is clear that Independent 
"affirmatively alleged" that the Authority rejected Independent's 
bids on the ground that Independent did not satisfy the MBE/WBE 
requirements.  In accordance with Rule 8(e)(2), if that ground 
was a pretense for the Authority's impermissible disqualification 
of Independent from the bidding process, Independent should be 
allowed to pursue its civil contempt claim.  On the other hand, 
if failure to satisfy the MBE/WBE requirements was the actual 
ground for the Authority's rejection of the bids, Independent 
should be allowed to pursue its claim that rejection on such 





redressability (that the injury can be remedied through the award 
of the contracts or damages and an injunction against future 
enforcement of the Utilization Requirements).   
 Turning from standing to the issue of whether 
Independent has stated a claim on which relief could be granted, 
we conclude that it has.  Independent's complaint alleges that 
the Authority has established MBE/WBE Utilization Requirements 
which require that all bidders on certain contracts provide with 
their bids a "utilization plan" that identifies the portion of 
work under the contract that will be subcontracted to "certified" 
minority- or women-owned firms.  According to the complaint, bids 
that do not meet the MBE/WBE utilization goals are rejected.  
Finally, the complaint alleges that the MBE/WBE Utilization 
Requirements were not established to remedy past discrimination 
or passive participation in discrimination by the City or 
Authority against minority- or women-owned construction 
companies.  These allegations support an equal protection claim 
under City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 468 (1989), 
in which the Supreme Court held that a race-based MBE utilization 
program was unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored 
to remedy specific discrimination or "passive participation" in 
discrimination by the enacting government unit.8  See also 
                     
8.  The gender-based preference embodied in the Authority's 
MBE/WBE Utilization Requirements will be reviewed under 
"intermediate scrutiny" rather than under the "strict scrutiny" 
applied to review of race-based preferences.  See Contractors' 
Ass'n of E. Pa. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1000-01 (3d Cir. 
1993).  Nonetheless, Independent should still be afforded the 
opportunity to demonstrate the absence of "probative evidence in 
support of" the gender-based aspect of the Authority's MBE/WBE 





Contractors' Ass'n of E. Pa. v. City of Phila., 91 F.3d 586, 596 
(3d Cir. 1996).9   
 
 C.  The Due Process Claims 
 Independent further alleges that the Authority deprived 
it of property without procedural or substantive due process when 
it disqualified Independent and rejected its bids on the Water 
Line Contract, the Grandview Avenue Project and the Sewer 
Improvement Contract.  The property interest of which it was 
allegedly deprived was an interest in these contracts created by 
Pennsylvania statutes requiring that public contracts be awarded 
to the lowest responsible bidder.  73 P.S. § 1622; 53 P.S. § 312. 
(..continued) 
Authority adopted the utilization requirements without having 
established any history of discrimination against either MBEs or 
WBEs.   
9.  We decline to accept the Authority's invitation to affirm the 
district court's dismissal of the equal protection claim on the 
merits on the ground that the MBE/WBE policy is "facially valid." 
 The Authority claims that the MBE/WBE Statement that must be 
submitted with each bid "itself does not require the use of 
minority or women subcontractors but merely requests information 
regarding the percentage of such subcontractors that the bidder 
intends to use on the project," and thus "does not create a 
discriminatory set-aside or quota program" but "serves merely to 
identify and guard against discrimination."  Appellees' Brief at 
16-17 (emphasis added).  We agree with Independent that this 
assertion of the facial validity of the Authority's MBE/WBE 
policy "is an argument on the merits inappropriate at the Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss stage."  Appellant's Reply Brief at 
12.  At this stage in the proceedings, particularly in light of 
the Authority Resolutions that expressly rejected Independent's 
Water Line and Grandview Avenue bids "for failure to meet the 
MBE/WBE requirements," Auth. Res. 67 & 68, App. at 197-98 
(emphasis added), "Independent's allegation that the [Authority] 
rejects bids which do not meet the MBE/WBE goals must be taken as 
true, and forecloses [the Authority's] assertion that they are 
not requirements but merely informational."  Appellant's Reply 





 The remedies that Independent seeks are an injunction barring 
the Authority from awarding the three contracts to anyone other 
than Independent, an injunction barring the City and the 
Authority from refusing to consider Independent a competent 
bidder on future City contracts, and an award of compensatory and 
punitive damages.  We will affirm the district court's dismissal 
of Independent's substantive and procedural due process claims, 
albeit for a reason different from that given by the district 
court. 
 The district court dismissed Independent's procedural 
due process claim on the ground that Pennsylvania law provided a 
post-deprivation remedy that afforded all the "due process" 
required by the Fourteenth Amendment.  According to the district 
court, the post-deprivation remedy, of which Independent had 
attempted to avail itself, consisted of "a judicial procedure for 
unsuccessful bidders to challenge whether a local contracting 
authority has violated a bidder's rights under the Municipal 
Authority Act."  Op. at 7-8.  The district court apparently 
reached this conclusion based on a statement in the Authority's 
Motion to Dismiss that there was a pending state action between 
the parties.  On appeal, however, the parties agree that 
Pennsylvania law in fact provides no such procedure.  
Nonetheless, the Authority and the City argue that the district 
court's dismissal of Independent's procedural due process claim 
should be affirmed on the alternative ground that their actions 
did not deprive Independent of any property interest protected by 





 The Supreme Court outlined the parameters of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s  procedural due process protection for 
property interests in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 
(1972).  First, the Court emphasized that "[t]he requirements of 
procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests 
encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty 
and property."  Id. at 569.  Second, the Court set forth the 
rationale for affording procedural protection to those property 
interests that are protected:  "The Fourteenth Amendment's 
procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security 
of interests that a person has already acquired in certain 
benefits."  Id. at 576 (emphasis added).  Third, the Court 
identified the attributes of the property interests protected by 
procedural due process: 
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person 
clearly must have more than an abstract need 
or desire for it.  He must have more than a 
unilateral expectation of it.  He must, 
instead, have a legitimate claim of 
entitlement to it." 
Id. at 577 (emphasis added).  Finally, the Court identified the 
sources to which courts should look to determine a plaintiff's 
"entitlement" to a claimed property interest.  Property 
interests, the Court declared, "are created and their dimensions 
are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as state law."  Id. 
 According to the teachings of Roth, therefore, 
Independent may not pursue its procedural due process claims 





as state law” affords it a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to 
be awarded a municipal contract for which it was the lowest 
responsible bidder.  Independent relies only on state competitive 
bidding law as the "independent source" providing its "legitimate 
claim of entitlement."10 
 Although Pennsylvania's competitive bidding statutes 
require that public contracts be awarded to the lowest 
responsible bidder, 53 P.S. § 312(A); 73 P.S. § 1622, 
Pennsylvania courts have long held that such laws are for the 
benefit of the public only and do not give a low bidder standing 
to challenge a municipality's failure to award a contract in 
accordance with the statute.  See, e.g., R.S. Noonan, Inc. v. 
School Dist. of York, 162 A.2d 623, 624-25 (Pa. 1960) (citing 
Commonwealth ex rel. Snyder v. Mitchell, 82 Pa. 343 (1876)); J.P. 
Mascaro & Sons, Inc. v. Township of Bristol, 505 A.2d 1071, 1074 
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1986); see also ARA Servs., Inc. v. School District 
of Phila., 590 F. Supp. 622, 629 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (“[T]he 
existence of ... a property interest [in the award of a municipal 
contract] cannot properly be derived from the regulations and 
specifications governing the procurement process in light of the 
Pennsylvania courts’ long and consistent refusal to recognize 
                     
10.  At oral argument, Independent's counsel suggested for the 
first time that paragraph 4 of the consent decree may have 
created a property interest for Independent.  This suggestion 
mistakes a right to a particular process for a substantive right 
in a contract.  The right to a particular process does not alone 
create a property interest.  Olin v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 
250 (1983).  Paragraph 4 gives Independent only a right to a 
particular kind of hearing; it does not give Independent any more 
legitimate expectation of receiving a contract than it has 





such an interest.”).  In R.S. Noonan, for example, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that "a disappointed bidder ... 
sustain[s] no personal injury which entitles him to redress in 
court."  162 A.2d at 625.  Statutes requiring the award of public 
contracts to the lowest bidder exist solely for the benefit of 
taxpayers, and only taxpayers suffer a legally cognizable injury 
from a violation of the statute that entitles them to bring suit. 
Thus, the statute bestows no legally enforceable right on a 
bidder prior to the acceptance of its bid.  Id.; see also Lutz 
Appellate Printers, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pa., 370 A.2d 1210 
(Pa. 1977); Highland Express Lines v. Winter, 200 A.2d 300, 303 
(Pa. 1964); Regional Scaffolding & Hoisting Co. v. City of 
Phila., 593 F.Supp. 529, 534 (E.D. Pa. 1984) ("The competitive 
bidding procedures are designed to protect the taxpayers from the 
wasteful or fraudulent expenditure of public funds, and create no 
rights in 'disappointed bidders' who are not also taxpayers.").11 
  
                     
11.  Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has dealt only with 
challenges brought under the bidding statutes themselves, the 
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court recently directly addressed the 
issue of the applicability of the R.S. Noonan standing principle 
to a due process challenge to the rejection of a low bid.  J.P. 
Mascaro & Sons, Inc. v. Township of Bristol, 505 A.2d 1071 (Pa. 
Cmwlth. 1986).  There, the court concluded that a disappointed 
bidder "has no standing to assert violations of its due process 
rights under either the federal or state constitutions as it has 
no legitimate claim of entitlement to the [municipality's] 
contract."  Id. at 1074.  The United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reached the same conclusion 
in ARA Servs. Inc. v. School District of Phila., 590 F. Supp. 
622, 629 (E.D. Pa. 1984), and J.P. Mascaro & Sons, Inc. v. 
Township of Bristol, 497 F. Supp. 625, 627 (E.D. Pa. 1980).  A 
line of cases from the Western District of Pennsylvania reached a 
contrary conclusion.  E.g., Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v. City of 
Erie, 537 F. Supp. 6, 10-11 (W.D. Pa. 1981) and 567 F. Supp. 





 These Pennsylvania cases demonstrate that one who bids 
on a public contract has no legitimate expectation of receiving 
it until the contract is actually awarded.  See Highway Express 
Lines v. Winter, 200 A.2d 300, 303 (Pa. 1964) (“By their bid [the 
unsuccessful bidders] proposed to contract for certain work; that 
bid was not accepted.  It was a mere proposal that bound neither 
party, and as it was never consummated by a contract, the city 
acquired no right against the [bidders] nor they against the 
city.”).  Since Independent's bids were never accepted, it never 
acquired an enforceable right with respect to the contract being 
awarded.  It, therefore, has not been deprived of a property 
interest that warrants procedural due process protection.   
 As Independent stresses, the law of this circuit 
recognizes that “an entitlement may exist for a benefit sought 
but not yet obtained if state law limits the exercise of 
discretion by the state official responsible for conferring the 
benefit.”  Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Phila., 945 F.2d 
667, 679 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d 
996, 1007 (3d Cir. 1980) (in banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1093 
(1981)).  Relying on this authority, Independent urges that the 
limitations placed on the Authority’s discretion by the 
competitive bidding laws rendered Independent “entitled” to 
receive the contracts for which it was the low bidder as soon as 
it submitted its low bids and the Authority decided to award the 
contracts.  Midnight Sessions and Winsett are inapposite here, 
(..continued) 
City of Pittsburgh, 502 F. Supp. 1118, 1131 (W.D. Pa. 1980).  We 





however.  Midnight Sessions involved the deprivation of a portion 
of a property owner's interest in the use of his real property.  
Winsett involved prison regulations that mandated work release 
for an inmate when he satisfied certain criteria.  We held that 
state regulations conferred on the inmate a legally enforceable 
right to work release.  As a result, the inmate had a liberty 
interest that warranted due process protection.  Here, however, 
under Pennsylvania law Independent clearly had no legally 
enforceable interest in receiving the contracts and thus had no 
"entitlement" to the benefit sought.   
 Finally, we turn to Independent's substantive due 
process claim.  Although the Third Circuit has recognized that a 
governmental deprivation that comports with procedural due 
process may still give rise to a substantive due process claim  
“upon allegations that the government deliberately and 
arbitrarily abused its power,” Midnight Sessions, 945 F.2d at 683 
(citing Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1129-30 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 851, and cert. denied, 488 U.S. 868 (1988)), we 
have also held that a substantive due process claim grounded in 
an arbitrary exercise of governmental authority may be maintained 
only where the plaintiff has been deprived of a “particular 
quality of property interest.”  DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of 
Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 600 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Homar v. 
Gilbert, 89 F.3d 1009, 1021 (3d Cir. 1996); Reich v. Beharry, 883 
F.2d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[I]n this circuit at least, not 
all property interests worthy of procedural due process 





process.”).12  Although our court has suggested that only 
fundamental property interests are worthy of substantive due 
process protection, DeBlasio, 53 F.3d at 599, it has provided 
little additional guidance regarding what specific property 
interests should receive substantive due process protection: 
We have held that “ownership is a property interest 
worthy of substantive due process 
protection,” [DeBlasio, 53 F.3d at 600], but 
we have found that neither interest in prompt 
receipt of payment for professional services 
                     
12.  Although Bello and Midnight Sessions both contained  
language indicating that substantive due process is violated 
whenever a governmental entity deliberately or arbitrarily abuses 
government power by, for example, taking actions that are 
motivated by bias, bad faith, or partisan or personal motives 
unrelated to the merits of the matter before it, Midnight 
Sessions, 945 F.2d at 683; Bello, 840 F.2d at 1129; see also 
Blanche Rd. Corp. v. Bensalem Township, 57 F.3d 253, 267-68 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 303 (1995); Neiderhiser v. 
Borough of Berwick, 840 F.2d 213, 217 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
488 U.S. 822 (1988), we do not read the cases to stand for that 
broad principle.  The court in Midnight Sessions expressly stated 
that it was assuming, without deciding, that the plaintiffs were 
entitled to substantive due process in the consideration of their 
applications for dance hall licenses.  945 F.2d at 682 n.11.  
Moreover, all of the cases involved zoning decisions, building 
permits, or other governmental permission required for some 
intended use of land owned by the plaintiffs, matters which were 
recognized in DeBlasio as implicating the “fundamental” property 
interest in the ownership of land.  53 F.3d at 600.  Thus, in 
light of the court’s explicit statement in DeBlasio that some 
"particular quality of property interest" must be infringed 
before substantive due process protection may be invoked, id. at 
600, these cases cannot be understood as affording substantive 
due process protection from every arbitrary and irrational 
governmental act, but only for those that deprive the plaintiff 
of a fundamental property right "implicitly protected by the 
Constitution."  Id. at 599; see also Blanche Rd., 57 F.3d at 268 
(plaintiffs stated a substantive due process claim because they 
claimed that defendants "acted deliberately and under color of 
state law to deprive them of their property rights by interfering 
in and delaying the issuance of permits") (emphasis added); 
Neiderhiser, 840 F.2d at 218 ("[I]f [plaintiff] can successfully 
demonstrate that the [town] arbitrarily and irrationally denied 
the [zoning] exemption, visiting a constitutional deprivation on 
[plaintiff], then [plaintiff] may prevail on its due process 





provided to the state, Reich, 883 F.2d at 
244-45, nor state law entitlement to water 
and sewer services, Ransom v. Marrazzo, 848 
F.2d 398, 411-12 (3d Cir. 1988), are the 
“certain quality” of property interest worthy 
of substantive due process protection.  We 
have also strongly suggested in dictum that a 
student’s right to continued enrollment in a 
graduate program does not rise to such a 
level on the ground that such an interest 
bears “‘little resemblance to the fundamental 
interests that previously have been viewed as 
implicitly protected by the Constitution.’” 
Mauriello v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of 
N.J., 781 F.2d 46, 40 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting 
Regents of Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 
U.S. 214, 229-30 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 
Homar, 89 F.3d at 1021.   
 We will leave for another day definition of the precise 
contours of the “particular quality of property interest” 
entitled to substantive due process protection.  We have no 
difficulty in concluding that the property interest alleged to 
have been infringed here, which we have concluded is not entitled 
to procedural due process protection, is not the sort of 
“fundamental” interest entitled to the protection of substantive 
due process.  Accordingly, we conclude that Independent has 
failed to state either a procedural due process claim or a 
substantive due process claim upon which relief can be granted. 
 
 IV.  Conclusion 
 We will reverse the judgment of the district court and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
